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The field of corporation and securities law has been greatly expanded
through judicial decisions in the last five years. For this reason, it is
difficult to choose among the recent cases, but four have been selected to
demonstrate the growth of fiduciary responsibility and the legal techniques
by which that responsibility has been made effective.
Before exploring the duty of loyality on the part of directors, officers and
controlling shareholders, it may be helpful to give some background relat-
ing to the Shareholder's Derivative Suit and the Class Suit, which are
fundamental in enforcing accountability.
1.
The Shareholder's Derivative Suit is known on the European continent
but is not widely used, as it is in America. It can be described as a
propulsive suit, brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation
against the wrongdoers, frequently the directors or those persons in control
of the company. The corporation is a defendant, nominally, but is actually
the plaintiff compelled to bring the action against the wrongdoers. It is
derivative in that it is "derived" from the corporation. In the words of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957):
The contrasting difference between a stockholder's suit for his corporation
and a suit by him against it, is crucial. In the former, he has no claim of his
own; he merely has a personal controversy with his corporation regarding the
business wisdom or legal basis for the latter's assertion of a claim against
third parties. Whatever money or property is to be recovered would go to the
corporation, not a fraction of it to the stockholder. When such a suit is
entertained, the stockholder is in effect allowed to conscript the corporation
as a complainant on a claim that the corporation, in the exercise of what it
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asserts to be its uncoerced discretion, is unwilling to initiate. This is a wholly
different situation from that which arises when the corporation is charged
with invasion of the stockholder's independent right...
Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with
derivative suits, they have accomplished much in policing the corporate
system, especially in protecting stock ownership from corporate manage-
ment. They have raised corporate standards by developing principles of
fiduciary responsibility and undivided loyalty. Plaintiff shareholders
frequently obtain the information on which the suit is based, from dis-
closure required by the Federal Securities Act, particularly from financial
statements that must be certified by independent public accountants.
The measure of effectiveness of the Stockholder's Derivative Suit can-
not be taken by computation of the money recovery in the litigated cases.
The minatory effect of such actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion
of large amounts from the companies and their stockholders by manage-
ment and insiders.
See in this connection Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 at 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1942):
Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with suits
they have accomplished much in policing the corporate system especially in
protecting corporate ownership as against corporate management. They have
educated corporate directors in the principles of fiduciary responsibility and
undivided loyalty. They have encouraged faith in the wisdom of full dis-
closure to stockholders.
A recent 1970 case in the U.S. Supreme Court, Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 53 1, raised a question that illustrates the nature of a derivative suit in
the United States. The real defendants were directors who had converted
assets of the corporation, and who were being asked to account and pay to
the corporation for the profits they wrongfully received. The issue before
the court was whether the case should be tried before a jury. If suit had
actually been brought by the corporation against the directors, a jury trial
would clearly have been allowed under our law. However, there was a
historical tradition pointing the other way, namely, that under American
law a derivative suit is one in equity to compel a corporation to bring the
action against the directors, and suits in equity are not entitled to jury
trials. Despite the historical origin of derivative suits in equity, Mr. Justice
White, speaking for the majority, held that the court should look through to
the real cause of action, and that a jury trial is proper for those issues as to
which the corporation would have been entitled to a jury if it had been
suing in its own right.
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II.
In addition to the derivative suit, there is, a fast-growing body of law
involving so-called Class Actions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now authorizes class suits which may be brought by one person
on behalf of a group of persons similarly situated. For example, if a man
purchased a Ford automobile in 1969 which shares a common defect with
many other Fords manufactured in the same year, he might bring an action
on behalf of all the purchasers of the 1969 Fords that suffered from the
same defect.
The class suit has expanded particularly in the corporate field in the light
of the growth of Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-to be
discussed below in connection with the case of S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur. For example, it has recently been held that a class suit can be
brought by a person who purchased securities on the basis of a registra-
tion statement, which was false and which purported to provide full dis-
closure with respect to the company and the securities to be offered. There
were serious and extensive deficiencies in the statement (particularly as to
the claims of cashavailable for distribution to shareholders). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Green v. Wolf Corporation,
406 F.2d 291 (1968) concluded that the rule permitting class suits covered
this kind of situation if:
(i) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
and
(2) there were common questions of law and fact, and
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.
In light of this development, the class suit may become as powerful an
instrument to raise standards in the corporate field as the derivative suit.
III.
The landmark case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), was based on the dis-
covery of vast mineral deposits in Canada by the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company (TGS). After initial visual estimates and preliminary assays
indicated the likelihood of an enormous mineral field, but before disclosure
of the discovery was made to the investing public or even to the full board
of directors, numerous TGS officers, directors and employees ("insiders")
began purchasing for their own accounts, through securities exchanges,
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sizeable quantities of TGS stock and "calls," short-term options to pur-
chase shares.
During the period of non-disclosure, some TGS personnel exercised
stock options granted by the company's stock option committee which was
not then privy to the information. Furthermore, some insiders told friends
and relatives, so-called tippees, about the "secret" data, and on the basis of
their recommendations, the tippees also purchased TGS stock and calls.
Later, as rumors of a major discovery became widespread in the financial
community, the TGS management issued a cautionary press release de-
signed to quell the rumors, even though data available to management
virtually assured its existence. A few days after the press release was
issued, the rumors were confirmed to the world, and predictably, the
market price of the stock increased quickly.
The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through en-
forcement proceedings, sought to impose liability on all TGS officers,
directors and employees who were apprised of the preliminary tests, and
who purchased or recommended purchasing TGS stock before effective
disclosure of the inside information to the financial community. Addition-
ally, the SEC sought injunctive relief against TGS for its issuance of a
misleading and deceptive press release.
The basis of the liability was Rule lOb-5, one of the anti-fraud provisions
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule lOb-5
prohibits any person from using interstate facilities or national securities
exchanges in connection with the purchase or sale of securities to engage
in fraudulent or deceptive behavior or to "make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading."
The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, greatly expanded the ambit of
Rule lOb-5, an expansion calculated to increase the effectiveness of the
rule in accomplishing its intended purpose: to promote fairness in securities
transactions and to insure "that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information."
To begin with, the court generally adopted a test set forth in In The
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), as follows:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements: first, the exis-
tence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
484 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
Since trading in a security on the basis of undisclosed information is not
prohibited unless the information is considered "material," the standard for
materiality is crucial in determining lOb-5 liability. The point of departure
for materiality remains the objective standard of whether the reasonable
investor would, if known to him, attach importance to the undisclosed
information.
The court did not stop with this traditional analysis of materiality,
however. As an additional standard, materiality is found in those "extraor-
dinary" developments which are "reasonably certain to have a substantial
effect on the market price of the security."
Finally, materiality can be found in particular facts which, though their
impact on market price is unpredictable, "might affect" the intrinsic value
of the security. This standard, above all others, is a warning to corporate
management that they must be cautious in their use of corporate in-
formation and that where the possibility of materiality exists, they are
advised either to fully disclose the data, or if in their reasonable business
judgment disclosure is inadvisable, to refrain from trading in the security.
For the court, evidence of the extensive purchases by the TGS personnel
was persuasive enough to infer that the undisclosed data was material and
ought to have been disclosed.
In summary, if undisclosed information is material, lOb-5 liability at-
taches to corporate "insiders," that is, officers, directors, and major stock-
holders, who use the information or recommend its use to others. The TGS
court confirmed a recent trend expanding liability to those thought to be in
a "special relationship" to the corporation, primarily lower echelon em-
ployees who obtain the inside information by reason of access to the
corporation.
Where TGS significantly departs from prior cases is in its suggestion
that non-corporate tippees may also bear lOb-5 liability even though they
may have only constructive knowledge of non-disclosure. In fact, as long
as the material information remains undisclosed, TGS seems to hold that
there can be no trading whatsoever by privies to the information, until after
full publication to the financial media plus at least a modicum of time
allowed for the investing public to absorb the information.
As to the allegedly deceptive press release, the court noted lOb-5's
broad regulatory purpose of protecting investors from inequities caused by
misleading or manipulative corporate information. However, since the
TGS case was one for injunctive relief by the SEC, the court did not have
to face the significant questions of whether willful misstatement or
non-disclosure ("scienter") is required in private actions for monetary
relief, and what the measure of damages would be to investors.
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IV.
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y. 2d 494, 248 N.E. 2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.
2d 78 (1969), establishes the availability of common law concepts in state
court proceedings to remedy trading by insiders in their corporation's
stock, on the basis of undisclosed material information. In Diamond, the
New York Court of Appeals recognized that officers and directors of a
corporation may be held accountable to the corporation, for profits realized
by them from transactions in the company's stock, which resulted from the
use of undisclosed confidential information relating to corporate affairs.
This case represents a resurgence of state court activity in an area of the
law which had come to be considered primarily a matter of federal statu-
tory regulation.
In a derivative action in the state court, the stockholder claimed that the
president and chairman of the board of directors, by virtue of their insider
positions, had learned of a substantial drop in the net earnings of the
corporation, and before the information was made know to the general
public had sold much of their stock in the company at prices which were
much higher than they would have been after disclosure of declining
profits. The court sustained the cause of action on the basis of the common
law principle that a fiduciary who acquires special knowledge or in-
formation in relation to his principal cannot exploit the confidential in-
formation for his own personal benefit. The breach of fiduciary duty owed
to a corporation by its officers and directors gives the corporation a "higher
claim" to the proceeds derived by the exploitation of inside information.
The defendants argued that while their actions were wrong, the corpo-
ration, on whose behalf the suit was brought, suffered no monetary loss
since it was not a party to the stock transactions. The court agreed that the
corporation itself suffered no direct financial loss but, nonetheless, the
purpose of a derivative action, in part at least, is to prevent wrongdoings by
management by removing any inducement to personal profit-making where
a fiduciary duty is owed. Moreover, the corporation does have an interest
in protecting its "reputation for integrity" and any undermining of the
corporate image in the eyes of the investing public constitutes a sufficient
interest to allow the corporation to assert its own claim.
Defendants urged that federal securities laws, primarily Section 16(b)
and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, preempt common law
liability and are exclusive remedies for insider trading. The court, dis-
agreeing that Congress intended any exclusion of state law involvement
when they enacted the federal legislation, indicated a continuing role for
common law principles where federal provisions were unavailable or
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ineffective. Section 16(b) provides that an officer, director or 10% stock-
holder who buys and sells securities of his corporation within a six-month
period is conclusively presumed to be trading ,on inside information and is
liable to the corporation for any profits derived from the transactions. But
rather than duplicate 16(b), Diamond supplements it as it has no six-month
time limitations on transactions, thereby significantly expanding liability to
situations where the fdderal statutory requirements are not met.
The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the federal regulatory scheme,
concluded that existing legislation is "rather limited" and that the state
court is still the primary source of effective common law remedies in
matters of corporate law. As to anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, and its principal rule 10b-5, under which the Diamond
defendants would undoubtedly have been liable to uninformed purchasers
of the defendants' shares, the court noted that sales of securities are
"characteristically anonymous transactions" handled by brokers so that
pairing defrauded buyers and defrauding sellers is virtually impossible.
Thus, the Diamond theory could prove common law relief where federal
anti-fraud provisions are unavailable. Since the gravamen of the Diamond
theory is the breach of a fiduciary relationship, presumably there is no need
to prove actual fraud, reliance, or scienter, elements which presently cloud
litigation under the federal laws; insider trading upon undisclosed material
information is sufficient.
Despite its potential as a gap-filler for existing federal regulation, a
troublesome aspect of Diamond is the chance of double liability, that is,
liability of the insiders to the corporation under Diamond and liability to
defrauded purchasers under Section 10(b). The Diamond court did not
agree that potential double liability is a defense for the wrongdoers, but
instead suggested that the procedure of interpleader is available to avoid
double payment. While doubtless correct that insiders should not be able to
avoid liability to one deserving plaintiff because another looms around the
corner, later courts will have to decide whether or to what extent insider
trading on undisclosed information warrants multiple liability.
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